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Immigration from poorer source countries is larger than from richer countries, so that poor
country immigrants have greater exposure to co-ethnics, leading to fewer incentives to
learn the local culture and assimilate. In this paper, the exposure channel through which
source country richness affects assimilating immigration is modelled through neighbour-
hood location choices and incentives to learn the local culture in the host country. Two
equilibrium outcomes are identified, in which, there is either only assimilating immigra-
tion in at least one neighbourhood of the host country (sorting equilibrium) when immi-
gration is from a rich source country, or there is some non-assimilating immigration in
all neighbourhoods (mixed equilibrium) when immigration is from a poor source country.
The presence of this exposure channel is tested using data from the Longitudinal Survey of
Immigrants in Canada: waves 1-3. Learning, rather than sorting into co-ethnic communi-
ties, is the main factor operating in the exposure channel between source country richness
and assimilating immigration.
Keywords: Cultural Assimilation; Language Proficiency; Pre-immigration Experience;
Ethnic Enclaves; Sorting; Exposure.
JEL Classifications: J15, Z13
1 Introduction
Immigrants exhibit strong location preferences in the host country. New immigrants tend to
locate close to existing migrant networks and where there are existing concentrations of im-
migrant groups, called ethnic enclaves. The presence of migrant networks explains to a large
degree the location choices of new immigrants in the host country (Nowotny & Pennerstorfer,
2019; Pedersen, Pytlikova & Smith, 2008). In turn the location of immigrants determines their
patterns of cultural and economic assimilation (Massey, 1985). New immigrants living among
co-ethnics have lower levels of English language skill acquisition (Allen & Turner, 1992; Beck-
husen, Florax, Graaff, Poot & Waldorf, 2012; Danzer & Yaman, 2016; Danzer, Feuerbaum,
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Piopiunik & Woessmann, 2018) and earnings (Allen & Turner, 1992; Warman, 2006; Xie &
Gough, 2011; Damm, 2009). But enclaves also serve as a means to minimize costs in commu-
nication with co-ethnics, and the cost of transportation from the consumption of ethnic goods
(Chiswick & Miller, 2005). Living in an ethnic enclave is essential for new immigrants be-
ginning the integration process into host country culture. Enclaves provide benefits to new
immigrants through the social networks embedded within the enclave. In addition, low skilled
immigrants living in an enclave earn about 13% more than comparable immigrants outside the
enclave (Edin, Fredriksson & Aslund, 2003). This is indicative that new immigrants have higher
returns to foreign experience and education inside the enclave (Xie & Gough, 2011; although
this effect varies across immigrant groups). Finally, enclaves are places of entrepreneurialism
where individuals start ethnic businesses (Portes & Shafer, 2006). Clearly, there is mixed evi-
dence to support the view that the enclave can be a useful resource to new immigrants through
its strong network links, but may also encumber new immigrants in their learning of the local
culture. However, it remains that a language barrier continues to exist for new immigrants and
the enclave is a means to alleviate some of the communication frictions that exist between new
immigrants and native-born.
New immigrants face cultural barriers that make communication with native-born difficult.
Given that communication with others is an integral part of a productive society, authorities in
major immigrant receiving country are increasingly interested in issues surrounding immigrant
assimilation because faster assimilation and/or close integration with native-born are assumed to
be beneficial for all. Alberto, Johann & Rapoport (2013) show increasing birthplace diversity
among all persons living in major immigrant receiving countries such as USA, UK, Austria,
Norway, Germany, Belgium and Canada between 1990 and 2000 (see table 1). On the other
hand, the birthplace among migrants of these countries did not become much more diverse
in the ten years 1990-20001. In fact, the USA grew in total immigration and became less
diverse. This indicates that immigrants are a growing proportion of the population but are
being selected from fewer source countries. In 2011, Canada had a foreign-born population
of 6,775,800 people (20.6 % of the total population). The highest proportion among the G8
countries. Asia (including the Middle East) was Canada’s largest source of immigrants over
the five years 2006-2011. Although the share of immigration from Africa, Caribbean, Central
and South America increased slightly. Canada appears to be becoming more diverse in its
source country selection (Statistics Canada, 2013). Ultimately, governments are not interested
in removing all immigration; some immigration is worthwhile and preferred. In the sphere of
immigration policy design, the type of immigration is of greater concern.
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Table 1: Ethnic, linguistic and changes in birthplace diversity indices across major immi-
grant receiving countries
% change in birthplace diversity 1990-2000
Country Ethnic Linguistic All Migrants
Australia 0.093 0.335 -4% 3%
Austria 0.107 0.152 119% 3%
Belgium 0.555 0.541 15% 2%
Canada 0.712 0.577 8% 1%
France 0.103 0.122 -1% 1%
Germany 0.168 0.164 33% 1%
Netherlands 0.514 0.335 2% 2%
Norway 0.059 0.067 46% 1%
New Zealand 0.397 0.166 8% 17%
Switzerland 0.531 0.544 0% 3%
USA 0.490 0.251 40% -3%
UK 0.121 0.053 21% 2%
Source: Alesina, Alberto; Harnoss, Johann & Rapoport, Hillel (2015). Birthplace Diversity and
Economic Prosperity. Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 21, issue 2 (June 2016), pp. 101-138.
Increasing diversity will invariably be accompanied by increasing communication frictions
between new immigrants and native-born. In this paper, I model how sorting and/or learning
among new immigrants alleviates those frictions. The size of the co-ethnic group combined
with clustering into co-ethnic communities determine the level of exposure to co-ethnics that
new immigrants will experience in the host country. Choosing to live in a neighbourhood that
is predominately co-ethnic reduces communication costs for the new immigrant, but compro-
mises integration into the host country culture (i.e. the assimilating decision). Overtime, ethnic
enclaves may be viewed as a “training system” for new immigrants before entering the main-
stream economy. The training system is a composite of labour market information, recruitment
practices and skill accumulation. The enclave is an institution of formal and informal traditions
that are different from the mainstream sectors of the economy. New immigrants will choose
to live in enclaves as a means to minimize communication costs while learning the local cul-
ture (Bailey & Waldinger, 1991; and Waldinger, 1993). Eventually immigrants learn the local
language. Preliminary evidence suggests that exposure to co-ethnics is associated with lower
assimilation rates in the short-run. Using the 2001 Canadian Census of Population and focus-
ing on the sub-sample of immigrants with no English speaking background, that is, immigrants
from non-English speaking households whose mother tongue is non-English, 18-64 years old,
and do not reside in Quebec. New immigrants that have lived in Canada for under a year, some
are living within enclaves consisting of predominately co-ethnics. The preliminary evidence
suggests that 81.68% of those living in an ethnic enclave2 spoke English and 83.37% of those
living outside the enclave did speak English. A difference of -1.69%** (0.0064). Among im-
2Construction of the ethnic enclave variable is discussed further in the empirical section.
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migrants that have lived in Canada for 2 years the difference increases to -2.71%*** (0.0031).
Among immigrants that have lived in Canada for 5 years the difference decreases drastically to
-0.84%** (0.0029), then -0.50%* (0.0028) after living in Canada for 10 years. In the short-run,
there are growing differences in the composition of immigration inside ethnic enclaves com-
pared to outside. Eventually, these differences disappear as immigrants learn the local culture
through formal or informal means.
The model developed in this paper extends the work of Lazear (1999) and Konya (2007)
by including a spatial dimension to account for the differences in communication frictions
across neighbourhoods. In the model, potential migrants from the sending country are ran-
domly matched with other immigrants and native-born in the host country. Due to productivity
differences between the source and host country, immigration from poorer countries is expected
to be larger than from richer ones. Figure 1 supports this claim, depicting a negative relation-
ship between source country RGDP per capita (i.e. a proxy for richness of the source country)
in 2000 and the total number of new immigrants in Canada from the 2001 Canadian Census of
Population. Since the share of immigrants will be larger from a poorer country, these migrants
will be exposed to co-ethnics more often. In turn, the higher exposure to co-ethnics will de-
crease assimilation rates for immigrants from the poorer country. Given that the only source of
friction in this model is finding a partner to communicate with and all surplus created is through
communicating effectively, the distribution of immigrants across neighbourhoods matter, as are
the subsequent incentives from learning the local culture within each neighbourhood. Since lo-
cation choices are non-random, this would imply multiple equilibrium outcomes with varying
levels of clustering, exposure to co-ethnics and assimilation rates across neighbourhoods.
The two channels of sorting and learning are interacting. Related empirical research to sup-
port the findings of this paper is the evidence on substitutability between sorting into co-ethnic
communities and learning the local culture. Bauer, Epstein & Gang (2005) provide evidence
from the US that Mexican migrants with improved English language proficiency choose smaller
networks (i.e. they rely less on the ethnic enclave). Similarly, a more recent study by Bredt-
mann, Nowotny Otten (2020) using within-country regional data from the European Union
shows that the ability to communicate in the host country language (measured by linguistic dis-
tance) and network size are substitutes, such that linguistic distance and size of the linguistic
network jointly determine location choices in the host country. The substitution between sorting
into ethnic enclaves and learning the local culture explains the finding in the empirical section
of the paper.
The empirical section of this paper uses data from the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants
in Canada: waves 1-3 where cultural assimilation is measured by proficiency in English, in-
vestment into native-born culture is measured by formal/informal learning of English, and
location in an ethnic enclave is determined jointly by use of an unofficial language at work
and clustering of co-ethnics in the CMA/CA of arrival. I provide estimates of source country
118
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richness on cultural assimilation through the exposure channel to test the implications of the
theoretical model. I find that sorting and/or learning is an important component of the chan-
nel through which source country richness affects assimilation rates. However, controlling for
formal/informal learning, source country richness does not have any significant effect on assim-
ilating immigration. This would indicate that sorting, independent from learning, is not a major
component of the relationship between source country richness and assimilating immigration. I
test whether sorting is the only thing being estimated by over-adjusting for the implied sorting
effect. By over-adjusting I intentionally include a proxy for co-ethnic sorting (a measure for
living/working in an ethnic enclave) into the regression model. Source country richness now
has a significant positive effect on assimilating immigration. This says that there is an alternate
channel unaccounted for by the current model through which source country richness affects
assimilation rates. I show that this alternate channel functions prior to sorting and is probably
related to quality of the immigrant group rather than size of immigration.
In the next section I formulate a simplified model that incorporates location choice among
neighbourhoods in the host country and show that multiple equilibria are possible. In section 3
of the paper I empirically test these findings.
2 Model
The mechanism functioning to transmit personal and contextual characteristics into language
proficiency are generalized as exposure, incentives and efficiency (van Tubergen & Kalmijn,
2009). Exposure and incentives function interactively to determine the level of cultural inte-
gration. However, exposure is determined by location preferences of new immigrants upon
arrival. Selection into a neighbourhood must be introduced into the model to better understand
the relationship between exposure and language accumulation. Exposure is typically measured
by the size of the immigrant group. An increase in the size of the immigrant group decreases
incentives to learn the local culture. These exposure effects are stronger within ethnic enclaves
leading to shifts in the composition of immigration within the enclave and outside of it. I will
present a theoretical model accounting for these features and derive the equilibria that arise
from this environment.
Communication frictions between native-born and immigrants are modelled into the host
country environment through a random matching framework. I assume there are only two
countries in the world: North and South, where the South is less developed relative to the
North. Thus migration flows from South to North. The North is further segmented into neigh-
bourhoods, but for simplicity I assume that there are only two neighbourhoods. There are two
sets of agents: native-born and immigrants. The native-born agents are located in the North and
potential migrants are located in the South. The potential migrants in the South make a deci-
sion about whether to stay in the South or migrate to the North. Additionally, potential migrants
must also decide whether to assimilate or not, and simultaneously choose which neighbourhood
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in the North to live and work. The location choice depends on the relative size of their networks
across the neighbourhoods of the North. Potential migrants choose a strategy that gives the best
outcome based on a set of individual-specific characteristics.
Individuals in the North are drawn together randomly so that matches are created. Efficient
matching is the primary mode of production. The model introduces communication frictions
that inhibit ease of production by randomly matching agents. A match between persons of
similar culture are able to generate a surplus but matches between persons of different culture
create no surplus. Matches between a non-assimilating and a native-born create no surplus
while matches between a non-assimilating and an assimilating immigrant, or an assimilating
immigrant and a native-born, do generate a surplus. The randomness in meeting people of
common cultures are effectively reduced in the presence of location choice. Potential migrants
that fail to assimilate choose less communication frictions by living in neighbourhoods with a
large number of immigrants. As new immigrants enter the host country their location decisions
are determined by the immigrant distribution and in turn influence their learning decision. In
this model the location decision of other new immigrants is influenced by the location and
learning decisions of other immigrant cohorts simultaneously. Equilibrium is achieved when
no individual has an incentive to relocate from their current neighbourhood and their learning
decisions are optimized.
2.1 Thresholds
In this section I will discuss further the potential migrant’s decision problem, how heterogeneity
is introduced into the model, derive the equilibrium thresholds for migrating and assimilating,
and discuss the equilibria that come out of the random matching immigration problem. The
migration cost is
Migration cost = µc
where c is an individual-specific migration cost that is distributed over all potential migrants
in the South, c ∼ F(c) and c ∈ [0, 1]. And µ < 1 is an index of physical distance between
the North and the South. Migration costs do not differ across neighbourhoods in the North.
Potential migrants may face assimilation costs of
Assimilation cost = θνι
where θ < 1 is an index of cultural differences between the North and the South and ι is invest-
ment into cultural assimilation by unit cost of investing ν. Assimilation costs are determined
by the level of investment that is undertaken. Investment is a part of the process of cultural
capital accumulation that is either amassed over time in a passive learning process where immi-
grants learn about the host country’s culture through time spent in the host country. Or, formal
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and informal investments may be made towards learning the culture as a decisive step towards
integration.
Learning is introduced through the capital accumulation process. Learning is distinguished
at their pre- and post-immigration levels where pre-immigration experience with the local cul-
ture is an individual-specific distribution in the source country, while post-immigration learning
comes as a form of investment into learning the local culture after the migration decision has
been made. Further learning in the host country are individual-specific decisions that are a
function of the investment returns and costs.
Cultural capital has two components, x = φ1ι + φ2ω where x ∈ [0, 1] is the total number
of native-born that the migrant can communicate with given the level of investment ι and pre-
immigration experience ω. The parameters φ1, φ2 ≥ 0 are constant conversion factors of pre-
and post-immigration experience into the units of x. Alternatively, φ1 and φ2 may be interpreted
as the returns to further learning and pre-immigration experience. For simplicity, I suppose that
φ1 = φ2 = 1. Cultural capital is dichotomous; immigrants can either talk to all native-born
(x = 1) or some (x = ω). Pre-immigration experience ω is accumulated capital or endowment.
Accumulated capital ω is distributed W(ω), ω ∈ [0, 1]. It represents accumulated learning
that includes the potential migrant’s experience with host country culture prior to migrating.
Investment is a dichotomous variable representing further learning, ι ∈ {0, 1}. New immigrants
with large pre-immigration experience (ω is large) face the lowest cost of investment (ι = 1−ω).
Assimilating immigrants can generate surplus with other immigrants or native-born. Non-
assimilating immigrants can generate surplus with other immigrants but the chance of meeting
another immigrant depends on the neighbourhood they will choose to live in and the size of
their network. Suppose there are two neighbourhoods i = A, B such that the potential migrant’s
neighbourhood choice is given by a general preference parameter, β ∼ B(β) and β ∈ [0, 1],
which is an individual-specific variable measuring the size of the immigrant’s network in neigh-
bourhood i relative to neighbourhood j.3 New immigrants with a large network in i = A, B
prefer this neighbourhood over any other j , i.
The assimilating immigrant can trade with anyone within their own neighbourhood and
earn a surplus of one, but must incur the cost of migration and assimilation. New immigrants
with the largest ω have the lowest assimilating cost and the largest incentive to learn the local
culture. Assimilating immigrants are not limited to trading with other immigrants, they can
also trade with native-born. However, assimilating immigrants are limited to trading within the
neighbourhood. The non-assimilating immigrant only trades with other immigrants within the
neighbourhood and face no assimilation cost. All meetings with Southerners will produce a
surplus of h with no migration and assimilation costs incurred. Those that stay in the South
will generate a surplus of h < 1 (this condition ensures that migration only moves from South
to North; that is, matches are more efficient in the North than in the South). The potential
3This formulation is similar to cultural segregation in a variant of the model presented in Bonn (2012a).
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migrant’s decisions are summarized by the following set of value functions
V ia = β (1 − θν(1 − ω) − µc) (1)
V ja = (1 − β) (1 − θν(1 − ω) − µc) (2)







V jn = (1 − β)
(
m j




Vs = h (5)
where i, j = A, B and j , i, the total number of native-born in neighbourhood i is normalized to
one, and mi ∈ [0,∞) is the total number of immigrants in neighbourhood i = A, B. Equations (1)
and (2) are the utility from assimilating immigration within neighbourhood i, j = A, B and j , i.
Equations (3) and (4) are the utility from non-assimilating immigration within neighbourhood
i, j = A, B and j , i. Equation (5) is the utility from not migrating.
Equating (1) and (3), and solving for ω derives the threshold level for assimilating in neigh-
bourhood i = A, B, such that ω ≥ ωa there is assimilating immigration, and non-assimilating
immigration otherwise. There are two seperate threshold conditions for each i = A, B.






a = 1 −
1
θν(1 + m j)
, (7)
where i, j = A, B and j , i. Among those in the assimilating group, the neighbourhood choice is
given by the threshold βa. The location choice for the assimilating group is derived by equating
(1) and (2), and solving for β, as such
βa = 1/2 (8)
Those assimilating immigrants with β ≥ βa there is immigration to neighbourhood i, otherwise
neighbourhood j. Similarly among non-assimilating immigrants, the neighbourhood choice is
derived by equating (3) and (4), and solving for β (or for c). This is the threshold βn(c) (or c(βn))
βn(c) =
m j/(1 + m j) − 2µc
mi/(1 + mi) + m j/(1 + m j) − 2µc
, (9)
or c(βn) =
m j/(1 + m j) − (mi/(1 + mi))(βn/(1 − βn))
2µ
(10)
Non-assimilating immigrants with β > βn(c) will choose to live in neighbourhood i, others
will choose neighbourhood j. In addition to threshold conditions (6) - (9) which describe the
individual’s assimilation and location incentives, the following four conditions determine the
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individual’s migration choices which must also be satisfied. Equating (5) to either (1) or (2)
provides the threshold for assimilating immigration to neighbourhood i or j, respectively. Sim-
ilarly, equating (5) to either (3) or (4) is the threshold for non-assimilating immigration to
neighbourhood i or j, respectively. The set of immigration thresholds are
cia(ω, β) =
1 − θν(1 − ω) − h/β
µ
(11)
c ja(ω, β) =








m j/(1 + m j) − h/(1 − β)
µ
(14)
Only those Southerners with small migration costs will migrate. Non-assimilating immigration
to neighbourhood i = A, B must satisfy c ≤ cin(β), ω < ω
i
a and β > βn(c). Non-assimilating
immigration to neighbourhood j must satisfy c ≤ c jn(β), ω < ω
j
a and β < βn(c). These con-
ditions for the non-assimilating group may be plotted in (c, β) space (see figure 2). Similarly,
assimilating immigration to neighbourhood i = A, B must satisfy c ≤ cia(ω, β), ω > ω
i
a, and
β > βa = 1/2. Assimilating immigration to neighbourhood j must satisfy c ≤ c
j
a(ω, β), ω > ω
j
a,
and β < βa = 1/2. Figure 3 shows these conditions for the assimilating group in (c, β) space
assuming ω > ωin.
It is more useful to view the decision space for both groups in a single diagram. However,
this requires one of the two variables, ω or β, to be held constant while the other is graphed as
a function of c. I have chosen to hold β constant and depict the various regions in (c, ω) space.
Note that the assimilating immigration thresholds cia(ω, β) and c
j
a(ω, β) are a function of β and
ω. For given values of β, the two functions are related as follows
cia(ω, β)

> c ja(ω, β) if β > 1/2
= c ja(ω, β) if β = 1/2
< c ja(ω, β) if β < 1/2
Figure 4 depicts the non-assimilating and assimilating immigration groups for different levels
of ω and c in the case when β > 1/2. A similar graph exists for β < 1/2 which would depict
assimilating immigration to neighbourhood j. Non-assimilating immigration to neighbourhood
j must satisfy the condition that c ≤ c jn(β), ω < ω
j
a and β < βn(c). The first two conditions
are identifiable in figure 4, but the last condition is not a function of ω. To be able to plot this
condition in (c, ω) space insert βn(c) into c
j
a(ω, β) and solve for c. The result is
c ja(ω, βn(c)) ≡ c
j
n(ω) =
mi/(1 + mi)(1 − θν(1 − ω)) − h(mi/(1 + mi) + m j/(1 + m j))
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Similarly, non-assimilating immigration to neighbourhood i must satisfy the condition that c ≤
cin(β), ω < ω
i
a and β > βn(c). Substitute βn(c) into c
i








m j/(1 + m j) − 2µcin(ω)
)
=
1 − θν(1 − ω) − h
µ
(16)
Equations (15) and (16) are depicted in figure 4. This information is sufficient to identify the
non-assimilating immigrant groups in both neighbourhoods.
2.2 Equilibria
Two equilibrium states exist for mi ∈ [0,∞): a sorting and mixed equilibrium. One of the
two states will emerge given levels of h. Each equilibrium has certain qualitative features. For
simplicity of exposition let the the level of ω at which cin(ω) = 0 and c
j
n(ω) = 0 be defined
respectively as
ωi ≡ 1 −
1 − h(1 + mi(1 + m j)/m j(1 + mi))
θν
ω j ≡ 1 −
1 − h(1 + m j(1 + mi)/mi(1 + m j))
θν
In a mixed equilibrium, immigration is mixed within neighbourhoods. That is, there is positive
levels of immigration in both neighbourhoods and there is assimilating and non-assimilating











max{0, F(cin(β)) − F(c(βn))}dB(β) (18)
and ωia > ω
i.
The left-hand side of (17) - (18) is the actual number of assimilating immigrants (ai) and non-
assimilating immigrants (mi − ai), respectively. These are equated to their respective expected
values. Similarly, the outcomes in a mixed equilibrium for neighbourhood j = A, B where j , i
is given by







F(c ja(ω, β))dB(β)dW(ω) (19)
m j − a j = L
(
W(ω ja) −W(ω j)
) ∫ m j(1+mi)mi+m j+2mim j
0
F(c(βn))dB(β) (20)
and ω ja > ω j.
The left-hand side of (19) - (20) is the actual number of assimilating immigrants (a j) and non-
assimilating immigrants (m j − a j), respectively. These are equated to their expected values.
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≥ ωi = ω j Rich Sorting
≥ ωi > ω j Poor Mixed
Total immigration is m = mi + m j and total assimilating immigration is a = ai + a j. Note that
the mixed equilibrium conforms to the corner equilibrium in Konya (2007) when ω ja = ω j and
cin(β) = 0 giving the special case in which m
i = m j.
In a sorting equilibrium there is mixed immigration in one neighbourhood and only assimi-
lating immigration in the other. The sorting equilibrium is given by equations (17) - (20) and
ωia ≥ ω
i and ω ja = ω j
for all i, j = A, B and j , i. Immigration to neighbourhood i is mixed but only assimilating in
neighbourhood j. Table 1 further summarizes the outcomes given h.
Although the equilibria are not unique, they are stable under very reasonable conditions.
Stability in the two neighbourhood case must satisfy the following condition
‖J(mi,m j)‖ < 1 (21)
on D = {(mi,m j) |mi,m j > 0} where J(mi,m j) is the Jacobian matrix of first-order derivatives












max{0, F(cin(β)) − F(c(βn))}dB(β) ≡ Γ
i(mi,m j)







F(c ja(ω, β))dB(β)dW(ω) (23)
+ L
(
W(ω ja) −W(ω j)
)2 ∫ m j(1+mi)mi+m j+2mim j
0
F(c(βn))dB(β) ≡ Γ j(mi,m j)
ωia ≥ ω
i and ω ja > ω j.
The first-order derivatives are provided in the comparative statics section of the appendix. Sta-
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The stability conditions also imply that ∂Γ j/∂mi > 0. The stability of a sorting equilibrium must
also satisfy condition (24), although ∂Γ j/∂m j < 0 and ∂Γ j/∂mi > 0 hold without assumption.
The first-order derivatives in the sorting case are also provided in the comparative statics section
of the appendix.
Finally, the emergence of either equilibrium type is dependent on the level of h as proposed
in column 4 of table 1. Proposition 1 below proves the existence of a level of h that switches
the equilibrium outcome from a mixed to a sorting.
Proposition 1. There exists an h, such that, for h < h the equilibrium is sorting, and mixed for
h > h.
Proof. Let m j be the solution to ω ja > ω j in a mixed equilibrium outcome. Similarly, the sorting
outcome is given by substituting ω ja = ω j into the right-hand side of equation (23). Equating
the former m j with the latter gives the following implicit function defining h by
h






F(c ja(ω, β))dB(β)dW(ω). (25)
Note that both sides of the equation include mi(L, h, µ, θ), as defined by equation 22, which is
also a function of h. Let φ(mi(L, h, µ, θ),m j(L, h, µ, θ), L, h, µ, θ) = 0 be the difference between
the left-hand and right-hand side of equation (25). The comparative statics in the appendix
show that ∂mi/∂h < 0, as such, the left-hand side of equation (25) is monotonically increasing
in h ∈ [0, 1), but is discontinuous at h = 1, at which point it becomes zero. The right-hand
side is continuous and monotonically decreasing in h ∈ [0, 1], and zero at h = 1. At h = 0 the
right-hand side is larger than the left-hand side. And, at h = 1 the left-hand side and right-hand
side are both zero and equal. Figure 5 shows clearly the existence of h. The left-hand hand side
of equation (25) is clearly shown by the upward sloping linear function with a discontinuity
at h = 1. Similarly, the right-hand side of equation (25) and mi(L, h, µ, θ) is also depicted as
the downward sloping functions, where m j ≥ mi. The three equations depicted in figure 5
are not linear in h, instead they are concave/convex at different levels of h ∈ (0, 1); linearity
is imposed for the sake of simplicity in exposition. Since the functions are monotonically
increasing/decreasing in h ∈ (0, 1), linearity suffices to depict the existence of h. The threshold




mi + m j + 2mim j
. (26)
Consistent with the graphical depiction is the result that a higher h is associated with a lower
level of immigration in both neighbourhoods. Moreover, changes in the parameter set {L, h, µ, θ}
will have implications for the level of h and, in turn, on the equilibrium outcome. 
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Under proposition 1, a richer source country does not necessarily imply that all immigra-
tion will be assimilating, as was the case in Konya (2007). Instead I find that one of the two
neighbourhoods in the North continues to receive the non-assimilating type even if the source
country is rich.
The intuition behind this result is best understood as a productivity, network and commu-
nication effect. Efficiency of matches in the South has an impact on the level of immigration.
As the South gets poorer there is more migration from the South because matches in the North
become relatively more productive. Incurring the migration costs and foregoing the matches
that could have been made in the South (the opportunity cost), the potential migrant finds these
costs are small relative to the gains from matches in the North. This represents a productivity ef-
fect increasing the total number of immigrants from poorer source countries. Non-assimilating
immigrants experience a debilitating communication effect if their pre-immigration experience
with the local culture is not large. Some of them will have large enough pre-immigration ex-
perience with the local culture to enter the assimilating group. The communication effect de-
termines the composition of immigration within neighbourhoods. Only if the communication
effect is larger than the productivity effect will all immigration become assimilating.
Given the productivity and communication effects, networks function to induce new im-
migrants to choose neighbourhoods where they have more family/friends. If the productivity
effect is large enough then total immigration is increasing. But based on the relative size of
pre-existing networks new immigrants will have a general preference for some neighbourhoods
over others.
3 Empirical Results
This section will test the implications of the theoretical model. There are four subsections: a
description of the data, a statement of the model’s theoretical predictions, the empirical model
identification strategy, estimation results, and further insights.
3.1 Data
The data used in this study is from the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants in Canada (LSIC).
The survey is a three wave study conducted on new immigrants and refugees to Canada, atleast
15 years of age, in the period October 2000 and September 2001 (approximately 65,000 new
immigrants). The survey excludes applications for immigration or asylum made within Canada.
The cohort of immigrants captured in the survey were subject to the non-discriminatory char-
acter of the 1976 Immigration Act (Bodvarsson & Berg, 2013) and were admitted prior to the
2002 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. The first wave is collected between April 2001
and March 2002, six months after arrival (12,040 immigrants of the 65,000 were recorded). A
second wave of data is collected on this same group of individuals six months later, between
December 2002 and November 2003 (9,500 immigrants were re-recorded). A final wave is
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conducted one year later, between November 2004 and October 2005 (7,715 immigrants were
re-re-recorded) (Haan, 2012). The attrition rate is 21.1% and 18.8% in waves 2 and 3. Attrition
is especially important in a study such as this because those immigrants that were lost from
the sampling between waves 1-2 and waves 2-3 have important information about their level of
assimilation or non-assimilation.
The focus of this study is new immigrants with little pre-immigration experience and low
levels of exposure to Canadian culture. The subsample used in this study are immigrants whose
mother tongue is non-English and do not reside in Quebec. This subsample is used throughout
unless mentioned otherwise.
Immigrants may become missing from subsequent waves for various reasons: change in
address and no follow-up contact information was provided, become deceased, or return to the
home country. The reason for becoming missing from subsequent waves is not recorded. This
becomes an issue because immigrants that returned to their home country due to difficulties in
the assimilation process will bias the final results of the model. Only the remaining successful
assimilates will be recorded and immigrant assimilation is overestimated. Characteristics of the
returnees may be nonrandom and the bias will be exacerbated.
There are two advantages to using the LSIC over cross-sections such as in Konya (2007)
and Lazear (1999). Firstly, the LSIC has a large number of pre-immigration characteristics
that are unavailable in the Census. Pre- and post-immigration formal and informal learning
of the local culture allows for controlling the learning effect to isolate the sorting effect in the
model. Secondly, the LSIC allows for the construction of a valid proxy for living and working
in an ethnic enclave. The disadvantage with the LSIC is that it only includes a single cohort of
immigrants from 2000-2001. However, this is not a major disadvantage given the trade-off. The
LSIC has depth on a single cohort of immigrants, but the Census has shallow information on
many cohorts. Since the pre-immigration variables and learning of the local culture is shown to
be important (described further in the results section below) and must be included in the model,
the LSIC provides new important information that is unavailable in a study that solely uses the
Census.
3.2 Model predictions
An empirical test of the relationships implied by the model requires the following definition for
assimilating immigration ρ j = a j/m j in neighbourhood j = A, B. The measure of assimilating
immigration ρ measures within neighbourhood composition of immigration in the North. Since
the jth neighbourhood receives no non-assimilating immigration in the sorting equilibrium, the
predicted outcomes of the model are summarized simply by
ρ j =
1 if h ≥ h,ρ j(m j(h, θ, µ, L),mi(h, θ, µ, L), h, θ, µ) if h < h (27)
133
www.RofEA.org
Review of Economic Analysis 13 (2021) 115–156
where h is defined by φ(mi(h, θ, µ, L),m j(h, θ, µ, L), h, θ, µ, L) from equation (25), i, j = A, B and
i , j. The parameters (L, h, µ, θ) impact the type of equilibrium through a threshold, direct
or indirect effect. The threshold effect determines the type of equilbrium in neighbourhood j
through changes in φ(.). Changes in the parameters have a direct impact on the composition of
immigration within the mixed equilibrium through changes in ρ j(.). The indirect effects of the
model are associated with changes in the composition through the size of immigration. Since
there are two neighbourhoods to consider, the parameters effect the composition of immigration
through mi(.) and m j(.). Table 2 summarizes the various effects.
Table 2: The effect of parameters on likelihood of assimilation ρ j
Parameter
ρ j(m j(h, θ, µ, L),mi(h, θ, µ, L), h, θ, µ)
Threshold Direct Indirect m j(h, θ, µ, L) Indirect mi(h, θ, µ, L)
L − 0 ? ?
h + ? ? ?
µ + − ? ?
θ ? ? ? ?
The full effect of the parameters on the composition of immigration are ambiguous, the
empirics cannot be used as a test of the model. On the other hand, although most immigrant
receiving countries will restrict immigration through a quota or points system, the total size of
immigration is typically exogeneously fixed at m = mi + m j. However, the model predictions
function through the relative size of immigration across neighbourhoods, which is determined
by individual preferences, some source country characteristics, and not the immigration author-
ities. Let ζ ≡ mi/(mi + m j) measure the distribution of immigrants across neighbourhoods in
the North. The effects of the parameters on the distribution of immigration are also estimated
and discussed in the further insights section.4
3.3 Empirical model
Exposure to co-ethnics is the effective channel through which source country richness impacts
assimilating immigration in the model. Since sorting amplifies the effects of exposure I ex-
pect source country richness’ effect on assimilating immigration to function through the sorting
variable.
Identifying the exposure channel through which source country richness affects assimilating
4See the appendix for further discussion on the direct, indirect and threshold effects.
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immigration requires a regression framework that controls for alternate channels, such as, se-
lection from within the source country, exposure within the household and immigration policy
in the host country. Similarly, factors such as pre-immigration experience with the local culture,
individual learning costs and other unobservable characteristics of the immigrant will probably
affect the sorting and learning decision simultaneously. Each of these are discussed and treated
appropriately in the following sections.
Sorting increases exposure to co-ethnics, through which source country richness affects as-
similation rates. A proxy for the sorting variable is included in the model which intentionally
over-adjusts (or over-controls) for the exposure channel. This addition to the model may be
used to determine if sorting is indeed the effect being estimated in the exposure channel be-
tween source country richness and assimilation rates.
The estimation equation is a regression model to determine the effect of exogenous time-
varying characteristics (Xist), exogenous time-invariant variables (Xis), investment into language
accumulation (ιist), living/working in an ethnic enclave in CMA/CA of arrival (ζis), and source
country richness (his) on the immigrant’s decision to assimilate overtime. The Xist and Xis
factors are treated as exogenous; they include demographic and economic information on im-
migrants as well as pre-immigration experience with the local culture and friend/family net-
works. The time-invariant variable Xis includes contextual variables, such as, source country’s
linguistic distance, population, geographic distance, and a measure of the share of co-ethnics
in Canada at the time of arrival mis. The variable ιist includes formal and informal investment
into language accumulation. Living/working in an ethnic enclave ζis is measured by choosing
to initially live in a CMA/CA where co-ethnics are clustered and working in an organization
that is predominately co-ethnic; this variable is endogenous. The assimilation variable ρist is
proxied by language proficiency, where immigrant i is from source country s and measured in
period t.
The three waves of the survey are treated as a panel. The benchmark regression model to
estimate is simply the effect of source country richness (his) on assimilating immigration (ρist).
ρist = γ0 + γ1his + γ4Xis + γ5Xist + ηi + εist. (28)
The estimated effect of his on ρist is γ̂1. This estimate captures exposure to co-ethnicity and
learning simultaneously. The next equation will control for investment in formal and/or infor-
mal learning ιist,
ρist = γ0 + γ1his + γ3ιist + γ4Xis + γ5Xist + ηi + εist. (29)
The estimated effect of his on ρist through the hypothesized exposure channel is γ̂1. Moreover,
exposure to co-ethnics occurs within or across neighbourhoods, and allows for non-random
location choices. The time-varying and -invariant variables in the model control for alternate
channels and confounding relationships. If the observed relationship between source country
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richness and assimilating immigration is through the exposure channel then by including the dis-
tribution measure into the model over-adjusts for the sorting effect. This procedure intentionally
controls for the sorting effect in γ̂1 that this study is trying to identify. This over-adjustment will
confirm whether sorting is the only effect being captured by the estimated γ̂1. The following
regression model includes the measure for distribution of immigrants across neighbourhoods
(ζis),
ρist = γ0 + γ1his + γ2ζis + γ3ιist + γ4Xis + γ5Xist + ηi + εist. (30)
The coefficient estimate of language investment is biased because of simultaneity; non-assimilating
immigrants are more likely to invest into learning the local culture. There is correlation be-
tween ιist and the individual-level error component ηi, implying that the coefficient on language
investment will not be signed precisely without a fixed effects estimator. That being said, causal
effects of investment are not the purpose of this paper.
I expect ηi to capture factors that inhibit or ease the selection into formal language programs
not currently captured in (28), such as distance to nearest ESL course, time cost, program costs,
and ability to learn new languages. Finally, the time-invariant variable ζis is endogenous because
new immigrants with low English speaking skills will choose smaller communication frictions
by locating in ethnic enclaves where access to ethnic goods is easy and learning the local culture
can happen in a low cost environment.
Immigrants that live and work in an ethnic enclave are identified using data from the Longi-
tudinal Survey of Immigrants in Canada: wave 1 and the 2001 Canadian Census of Population.
The LSIC was used to provide information on whether the immigrant worked in an organization
that predominately spoke a language other than English or French, in wave 1. The Census was
used to identify whether a given ethnic group is over-represented in a census tract (CT) relative
to the CMA/CA in which it is located. If more than 50% of CT’s are over-representative of the
ethnic group then the CMA/CA is considered to be clustering co-ethnics. Immigrants in the
LSIC are identified as living/working in an ethnic enclave if they work in an organization pre-
dominately speaking a language other than English or French in wave 1, and if they belong to
an ethnic group that lived in a CMA/CA of first arrival that clustered co-ethnics as determined
by the Census.
A standard set of controls are used throughout. The controls that enter the model are based
on previous studies that have shown the specific variable to be an important determinant of
English speaking proficiency. The variables used in this study are described in table 8 of the
appendix. Given that the language proficiency variable is subjectively determined there is po-
tential response error arising from lack of a stable benchmark. That is, respondents in the LSIC
may report decreasing language proficiency across waves. Whether the decreases in language
proficiency are actually due to worsening language skills or due to a lack of a benchmark is
difficult to determine. This is problematic because, in the estimation strategy described above, I
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may wrongly categorize a respondent to having worsening language proficiency when the prob-
lem was simply a response error. This error will underestimate assimilation levels. The extent
of the measurement error is described in table 3 below
Table 3: Measurement error in English speaking proficiency across waves.
Wave 1 - 2 Wave 2 - 3
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage
Worse 14,798 15% 19,286 20%
Better 28,379 29% 21,812 22%
Same 53,870 56% 55,949 58%
Total 97,047 100% 97,047 100%
Note: The summary statistics produced in this table uses the raw categorical five-level English
speaking proficiency variable to be as accurate as possible.
At most 15% of new immigrants that provided responses in waves 1 and 2, and 20% in waves
2 and 3, could be attributed to the measurement error. Since this error would underestimate
assimilation levels, the results of this study may be interpreted as a lower bound. For the
remainder of the paper, the five-level categorical English speaking variable will be collapsed
into a dummy variable which would minimize the influence of the measurement error. But if
the error is non-random then the bias will persist. It is expected that the measurement error is
more likely to occur among refugees, those with low English speaking proficiency, those who
are less educated, and have less experience with the English language. Table 4 shows there is
no systematic response in worsening English speaking proficiency between refugees and non-
refugees, and between those with less than a high school education and those with at least a high
school education. Moreover, those with pre-immigration experience with the English language
are more likely to respond with worsening English speaking skills than those without; either
because they are understating their knowledge of the English language or they discover, after
immigration, that the quality of their pre-immigration experience is low.
On the other hand, those with lower English speaking proficiency in wave t are more likely
to report worsening English speaking proficiency in wave t + 1 compared to those with higher
proficiency in wave t. This evidence indicates there will be some bias associated with measure-
ment error. The measurement error in the dependent variable will bias coefficient estimates of
the time-invariant variables in the model.
137
www.RofEA.org
Review of Economic Analysis 13 (2021) 115–156
Table 4: Worsening of English speaking proficiency across waves t and t + 1 by refugee
status, English speaking proficiency, education, and formal pre-immigration experience
with the English language.
Refugee Low proficiency Less than high school Pre-immigration experience
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Waves 1 - 2
Worse 14.76 15.28 29.39 9.62 13.86 15.49 17.74 7.92
Better 46.61 28.20 21.80 32.21 35.32 28.16 29.45 28.67
Same 38.63 56.53 48.81 58.17 50.82 56.34 52.81 63.41
Waves 2 - 3
Worse 22.96 19.69 39.09 12.57 20.75 19.72 21.42 15.41
Better 34.33 21.76 15.30 25.20 22.26 22.51 23.67 19.01
Same 42.71 58.55 45.61 62.23 56.99 57.77 54.91 65.58
Note 1: The summary statistics produced in this table uses the raw categorical five-level English
speaking proficiency variable.
Note 2: Low proficiency is measured by speaking English fairly well, poorly and not at all in wave t + 1.
Note 3: Less than high school is measured by highest level of formal education attained outside Canada
in wave t + 1.
3.4 Results
Firstly, I estimate the benchmark model of equation (28). The probit estimates are presented
below in the first column of table 5. The effect of source country richness on assimilating
immigration is measured by the coefficient on RGDP per capita. As expected, source coun-
try richness has a significant positive effect on assimilating immigration. But this estimate is
capturing both, the channel of exposure to co-ethnicity and learning.
The second equation (29) controls for learning by including the set of formal/informal in-
vestment variables. Now the coefficient estimate on RGDP per capita is insignificant as shown
in column 2 of table 5. This would say that exposure to co-ethnicity is not a part of this channel.
However, OLS estimates are significant (see column 3 of table 10).
The third column of table 5 includes the network variable (β) into the model. This variable
controls for individual preference in neighbourhood choice. Networks are proxied by whether
the immigrant had family/friends in their current area (or nearby area) of residence and chose the
area because family/friends live there. The effect of this variable on assimilating immigration
is negative but insignificant. The source country richness coefficient also remains insignificant.
The fourth column includes the ethnic enclave variable over-adjusting for the implied sorting
effect. Including this variable in the model changes the coefficient estimate of RGDP per capita
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and makes it significant. This indicates that there is an alternate channel through which source
country richness affects assimilation rates.
The ethnic enclave variable ζ is endogenous because immigrants with low English speaking
skills are more likely to choose to live and work within the enclave. Additionally, the ethnic
enclave variable is interacting with source country richness. I instrument the ethnic enclave
variable with housing costs in CMA/CA of arrival from the 2001 Canadian Census of Popu-
lation. Housing costs are significantly and positively correlated with living and working in an
ethnic enclave because new immigrants will choose to live in the low cost ethnic enclave if the
CMA/CA has high average cost of housing. Table 6 provides a sorting regression where the
coefficient estimate of housing costs in CMA/CA of arrival is significant and positive. Also,
housing costs in CMA/CA of arrival has no observed association with assimilation rates. The
fifth column instruments the ethnic enclave variable with housing costs in CMA/CA of arrival.
The estimated effect of living and working in an ethnic enclave becomes larger. The coeffi-
cient effect of source country richness is still significant, implying the presence of an alternate
channel. The further insights section discusses a possible alternate pathway.
Investment ι is measured by further learning of English in Canada. Further learning is dif-
ferentiated by formal and informal means. Formal and informal investment have a significant
effect on assimilating immigration. The sign of formal and informal learning is negative because
of simultaneity.
A dummy variable for pre-immigration formal and informal learning of English proxies
for ω in the theoretical model. Pre-immigration learning of English enters significantly and
positive. This is expected since individuals with higher levels of pre-immigration experience
with the local culture are more likely to enter the assimilating group if their experience is large,
or have a low investment cost to learning the local culture.
The restrictions implied by the immigration policy in place at the time of arrival are proxied
by ethnic share in Canada at the start of the survey (m). The coefficient estimate of this variable
on assimilating immigration is positive but insignificant.
Finally, the coefficients for population levels (L) relative to Canada, linguistic distance (θ)
and geographic distance (µ) of the capital city in country of birth to Ottawa are estimated. The
effect of source country population on English speaking proficiency is negative. Geographic
distance and cultural differences have no significant effect on assimilating immigration.
In table 10 of the appendix I estimate the benchmark model of equation (28) by OLS. The
fourth column of table 10 subsets the data to those source countries that scored “low” or “very
low” on the English proficiency index (EF EPI, 2017)5. There is much less variation in RGDP
per capita and the countries were predominately low income. As expected the coefficient esti-
mate on RGDP per capita is insignificant but still positive.
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Refugees in the LSIC represent 15% of the sample. Although this is considerable, excluding
this group from the estimation model makes no difference to the estimated coefficients on lan-
guage investment and living/working in an ethnic enclave. Also, the survey weighting accounts
for the oversampling.
Table 5: Probit estimation results of English speaking proficiency: households whose
mother tongue is not English and do not reside in Quebec.
Dependent variable: English speaking
proficiency
Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled IV
RGDP per capita (h) 0.156∗∗ 0.119 0.116 0.129∗ 0.150∗∗
(0.0555) (0.0614) (0.0614) (0.0630) (0.0569)
Network (β) -0.0827 -0.0716 0.0363
(0.0572) (0.0573) (0.0574)
Ethnic enclave (ζ) -0.368∗∗∗ -2.588∗∗∗
(0.0602) (0.384)
Informal investment (ι) -0.272∗∗∗ -0.271∗∗∗ -0.273∗∗∗ -0.144∗
(0.0434) (0.0435) (0.0431) (0.0641)
Formal investment (ι) -0.241∗∗∗ -0.242∗∗∗ -0.248∗∗∗ -0.203∗∗∗
(0.0482) (0.0482) (0.0483) (0.0542)
Formal pre-immigration experience (ω) 0.618∗∗∗ 0.617∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗
(0.0510) (0.0510) (0.0512) (0.119)
Informal pre-immigration experience
(ω)
0.360∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗ 0.174∗
(0.0501) (0.0501) (0.0504) (0.0837)
Share of co-ethnic group in Canada (m) 1.709 0.0104 0.0522 0.553 3.200∗∗
(1.038) (1.037) (1.036) (1.042) (1.074)
Population level (L) -0.0257∗∗∗ -0.0168∗∗ -0.0169∗∗ -0.0183∗∗ -0.0197∗∗∗
(0.00600) (0.00612) (0.00611) (0.00620) (0.00586)
Geographic distance (µ) 0.00163 -0.0242∗ -0.0237 -0.0231 -0.00563
(0.0118) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0116)
Linguistic distance (θ) -0.0526 -0.00734 -0.0102 0.00866 0.0378
(0.219) (0.222) (0.222) (0.222) (0.176)
Months since arrival -0.0399∗ -0.0363 -0.0366 -0.0373 -0.0290
(0.0196) (0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0206) (0.0180)
Time-varying controls (Xist) X X X X X
Time-invariant controls (Xis) X X X X X
Survey wave controls (t) X X X X X
N 216,672 204,122 204,122 203,858 203,858
∗p < 0.05∗∗p < 0.01∗∗∗p < 0.001
Note 1: All models are weighted due to Statistics Canada’s RDC disclosure process.
Note 2: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
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3.5 Further insights
Source country richness impacts assimilating immigration through exposure, where exposure is
determined by sorting into co-ethnic neighbourhoods. The distribution of co-ethnics, or sorting,
measure is defined as ζ ≡ m j/(mi +m j). The effect of source country richness on the distribution
of co-ethnics is given by the estimating equation
ζis = α0 + α1his + α2Xis + α3Xist + α4Iis + εist, (31)
where Iis is housing costs in CMA/CA of arrival. The regression model (31) is estimated by pro-
bit and the results of the estimates are provided in table 6. This result supports the hypothesis of
the enclave as a “training system” for new immigrants (Bailey & Waldinger, 1991; Waldinger,
1993). Those without pre-immigration experience with the local culture are more likely to live
and work in the ethnic enclave, although the effects reported are not significant. The ethnic
enclave provides new immigrants with an environment that minimizes communication frictions
with native-born until the local culture is learned. Furthermore, a recent study by Bredtmann,
Nowotny & Otten (2020) using within-country regional data from the European Union showed
that the ability to communicate in the host country language (measured by linguistic distance)
and network size are substitutes, such that linguistic distance and size of the linguistic net-
work jointly determine location choices in the host country6. This further contributes to the
evidence that immigrants coming from more culturally distinct source countries (relative to the
host country) rely more on their co-ethnic networks, which is reflected in their location choices
in the host country.
Consistent with the results presented in the previous section is a network interpretation of
the model. The positive effect of source country richness on assimilating immigration can
be explained by greater exposure to co-ethnics. But greater exposure to co-ethnics cannot be
solely attributed to size of immigration and clustering of immigrants. There are other factors
that determine clustering of co-ethnics; for instance, the qualitative features of the immigrant
network must also matter.
Relative RGDP per capita can be interpreted as the immigrant group’s average quality. New
immigrants that belong to a higher quality group benefit from locating among co-ethnics be-
cause the group as a whole assimilates more easily to the local culture. In this sense, quality
of the network, rather than size, also plays a role (Edin, Fredriksson & Aslund, 2003). This
is clear from table 6. Source country richness has a significant positive impact on clustering
into co-ethnic communities conditional on size of immigration (i.e. share of co-ethnic group in
6I have not accounted for the correlation in size of co-ethnic networks and linguistic distance due to the
timing of publication during the COVID-19 lockdown, restricting access to the data at Statistics Canada’s
Research Data Center. Future research should consider including an interaction between linguistic dis-
tance and share of co-ethnics as a control in the model.
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Table 6: Probit estimation results of living/working in an ethnic enclave: households whose
mother tongue is not English and do not reside in Quebec.
Dependent variable: Living/working in
an ethnic enclave
Pooled
RGDP per capita (h) 0.211**
(0.0771)
Housing costs in CMA/CA of arrival (I) 0.104***
(0.0309)
Informal pre-immigration experience (ω) -0.0920
(0.0736)
Formal pre-immigration experience (ω) -0.0892
(0.0782)




Population level (L) -0.0268**
(0.00885)
Geographic distance (µ) 0.0296
(0.0207)
Linguistic distance (θ) 0.0862
(0.356)
Months since arrival -0.0150
(0.0236)
Time-varying controls (Xist) X
Time-invariant controls (Xis) X
Survey wave controls (t) X
N 216,414
∗p < 0.05∗∗p < 0.01∗∗∗p < 0.001
Note 1: All models are weighted due to Statistics Canada’s RDC disclosure process.
Note 2: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Canada, m). In addition, other attributes of group quality such as connectedness of the co-ethnic
community will also be relevant.
4 Conclusion
Immigrants face frictions in communication in their life within the host country due to cultural
gaps. Cultural assimilation plays a primary role in determining the success of immigrants by
overcoming those cultural barriers. Immigrants assimilate by a process of learning. However,
location choices are expected to crowd incentives to further learning so that exposure to other
immigrants becomes the primary determinant on cultural accumulation.
Immigrants from poorer source countries have a lower assimilation rate than comparable
immigrants from richer countries. This paper has shown that immigrants from poorer source
countries have lower assimilation rates because immigrants from poor source countries expe-
rience the largest productivity gains from migrating, leading to an increase in their presence
within the host country and in turn a greater exposure to co-ethnics.
There are externalities (feedback) associated with the size of immigration within neighbour-
hoods. Some neighbourhoods will receive more immigrants relative to others. Those neigh-
bourhoods with a large number of immigrants will attract more of the non-assimilating type.
Since immigrants from poor source countries are a bigger group, their exposure to co-ethnics
will be larger and co-ethnic neighbourhoods will have lower assimilation rates. Among rich
source countries total immigration to the host country is smaller. There are fewer externalities
and the composition of immigration within neighbourhoods is favorable towards the assimilat-
ing type. Immigrants will sort, such that neighbourhoods with fewer immigrants will receive
all assimilating types.
Empirically, the implications of the model are tested using longitudinal Canadian data. As
predicted, immigrating from a richer source country has a positive effect on assimilating im-
migration. This effect is observed due to sorting and/or learning. By controlling for learning,
the exposure to co-ethnicity channel is not a major determinant of assimilation rates in the host
country. However, over-adjusting for the sorting effect, source country richness has a signif-
icant positive effect on assimilation rates. There appears to be an alternate channel present.
Presumably, this alternate channel is the quality, rather than size, of immigration.
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In Z. Blaskó (eds.) In Focus: International Migration, 150-158.




MONTEIRO Cultural Assimilation: Learning and Sorting
Lazear, Edward P. (1999). Culture and Language. Journal of Political Economy 107(S6), S95–
S126.
Lazear, Edward P. (2017). Why are Some Immigrant Groups More Successful than Others?
NBER Working Paper Series Working Paper No. 23548.
Massey, Douglas S. (1985). Ethnic residential segregation: A theoretical and empirical review.
Sociology and Social Research 69(3), 315–350.
Mayer, Thierry & Zignago, Soledad (2011). Notes on CEPII’s distances measure: The GeoDist
database. CEPII Working Paper Working Paper No. 2011-25.
Melitz, Jacques & Toubal, Farid (2014). Native language, spoken language, translation and
trade. Journal of International Economics 93(2), 351–363.
Nowotny, Klaus & Pennerstorfer, Dieter (2019). Network migration: do neighbouring regions
matter? Regional Studies 53(1), 107–117.
Pedersen, Peder J.; Pytlikova, Mariola & Smith, Nina (2008). Selection and network effects -
Migration flows into OECD 1990-2000. European Economic Review 52, 1160–1186.
Portes, Alejandro & Shafer, Steven (2006). Revisiting the Enclave Hypothesis: Miami Twenty-
Five Years Later. The Center for Migration and Development Working Paper Series, Work-
ing Paper No. 06-10.
Rabe-Hesketh, Sophia & Skrondal, Anders (2012). Multilevel and Longitudinal Modeling Us-
ing Stata. Volume I: Continuous Responses. STATA Press 3rd Edition.
Rabe-Hesketh, Sophia & Skrondal, Anders (2012). Multilevel and Longitudinal Modeling Us-
ing Stata. Volume II: Categorical Responses, Counts and Survival. STATA Press 3rd Edition.
Statistics Canada (2007). Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada (LSIC). Statistics
Canada. Using York University Research Data Center. Accompanying documentation:
Microdata User Guide.
Statistics Canada (2013). Immigration and Ethnocultural Diversity in Canada. Statistics
Canada Catalogue no. 99-010-X2011001.
van Tubergen, Frank & Kalmijn, Matthijs (2009). A Dynamic Approach to the Determinants
of Immigrants’ Language Proficiency: The United States, 1980-2000. The International
Migration Review 43(3), 519–543.
Waldinger, Roger (1993). The Ethnic Enclave Debate Revisited. International Journal of Ur-
ban and Regional Research 17(3), 428–436.
Warman, Casey (2007). Ethnic Enclaves and Immigrant Earnings Growth. The Canadian Jour-
nal of Economics 40(2), 401–422.




Review of Economic Analysis 13 (2021) 115–156
5 Appendix
5.1 Comparative statics over the thresholds
The following are a set of useful comparative statics used throughout the main body of the text
in derivations, proofs and analysis. The effect of θ and mi on the threshold for assimilating is
given by


















a = 1 −
1
















θν(1 + m j)2
> 0.
The function c(βn) is the threshold between choosing to locate in neighbourhood j over i. The
following derivatives provide the effect of changes in µ, mi and m j.
c(βn) =






m j/(1 + m j) − (mi/(1 + mi))(βn/(1 − βn))
2µ2











2µ(1 + m j)2
> 0.
The equations cia(ω, β) and c
j
a(ω, β) are the thresholds for assimilating immigration in neigh-
bourhoods i and j. The following derivatives provide the effect of changes in h, µ and θ.
cia(ω, β) =
1 − θν(1 − ω) − h/β
µ
, c ja(ω, β) =







































The equations cin(β) and c
j
n(β) are the threshold between non-assimilating immigration in neigh-
bourhoods i and j. The following set of derivatives provide the effect of changes in h, µ, mi
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and/or m j.
cin(β) =
mi/(1 + mi) − h/β
µ
, c jn(β) =




































µ(1 + m j)2
> 0,
(32)
5.2 Comparative statics over ωi and ω j
The equations ωi and ωi are defined as the ω at which cin(ω) = 0 and c
j
n(ω) = 0. The effect of
changes in h, θ, mi and m j are given as
ωi = 1 −
1 − h(1 + mi(1 + m j)/m j(1 + mi))
θν
, ω j = 1 −




















1 + m j



































1 − h(1 + m j(1 + mi)/mi(1 + m j)
θ2ν
< 0,
5.3 Comparative statics over Γi(mi,m j) and Γ j(mi,m j)
Consider a mixed equilibrium outcome k(1 − ω) ≤ 1, ωia ≥ ω
i and ω ja > ω j. The elements
of the Jacobian matrix J(mi,m j) are the set of first-order partial differentials of Γi(mi,m j) and
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Since Γi(mi,m j) and Γ j(mi,m j) are also directly affected by the parameters {L, h, µ, θ}. These
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 ∫ m j(1+mi)mi+m j+2mim j
0
F(c(βn))dB(β) S 0
In a sorting equilibrium outcome k(1 − ω) ≤ 1, ωia ≥ ω
i and ω ja = ω j. The first-order
differentials of Γi(mi,m j) in terms of mi and m j, and {L, h, µ, θ} are the same as in the mixed
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5.4 Comparative statics over mi(L, h, µ, θ) and m j(L, h, µ, θ)
Since mi = Γi(mi,m j;P) and m j = Γ j(mi,m j;P) implicitly define mi and m j, where P ≡

































Solving the two equation systems simultaneously provides the following set of reduced form




∂Γi/∂m j × ∂Γ j/∂P + ∂Γi/∂P × (1 − ∂Γ j/∂m j)





∂Γ j/∂mi × dmi/dP + ∂Γ j/∂P
1 − ∂Γ j/∂m j
.
The signs of the partial differentials, ∂Γi/∂P and ∂Γ j/∂P, have already been determined in the
previous section. Additionally, ∂Γi/∂m j = 0 which simplifies the problem further. Moreover,
the stability conditions require that ∂Γi/∂mi < 0 and ∂Γ j/∂m j < 0. Finally, ∂Γ j/∂mi > 0 is also
implied by the stability conditions. Using this information the effect of P on mi and m j in the
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5.5 Direct effects
The direct effects of table 2 are determined by changes in P = {L, h, µ, θ} on ρ j = a j/m j. To








F(c ja(ω, β))dB(β)dW(ω) > 0
B = L
(
W(ω ja) −W(ω j)
) ∫ m j(1+mi)mi+m j+2mim j
0
F(c(βn))dB(β) > 0
Now ρ j can be written in a simpler form, as a function of η. It can then be inferred that ρ j is a








W(ω ja) −W(ω j)
) , ∂ρ j
∂η
> 0 ∀ k(1 − ω) ≤ 1
The parameters in the model P = {L, h, µ, θ} are expected to have a direct effect on ρ j = a j/m j.













∂A/∂P × B − ∂B/∂P × A
B2
.
All that remains to sign the direct effect is differentiating A and B in terms of the elements in
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The indirect effects of table 2 are determined by changes in P = {L, h, µ, θ} on ρ j = a j/m j
















∂A/∂mi × B − ∂B/∂mi × A
B2
.
But since ∂B/∂mi was ambiguously signed, all the indirect effects through mi(L, h, µ, θ) are
















∂A/∂m j × B − ∂B/∂m j × A
B2
.
Again, ∂B/∂m j is ambiguously signed, all the indirect effects through m j(L, h, µ, θ) are ambigu-
ous. The results are depicted as such in table 2.
5.7 Threshold effects
The threshold effects are identified by changes in P = {L, h, µ, θ} on equation (25), or φ(.). These
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Table 8: Description of variables used in this study.
Variable Name Description
Speaking proficiency English speaking proficiency of the respondent (5-level categorical)
Ethnic enclave Arrived in a CMA/CA that is overrepresented by co-ethnics
(Census of Population 2001), and worked in an organization that is
mostly co-ethnic (Dummy)
Housing costs in CMA/CA
of arrival (in $’000’s)
Average cost of housing in CMA/CA of arrival. (Continuous;
Census of Population 2001)
Formal investment Learned to speak English in language class or school (Dummy)
Informal investment Learned to speak English through family & friends, work,
non-language classes, media, self-study and/or other (Dummy)




The respondent lived in Vancouver at the time of landing in Canada
(Dummy)
Share of co-ethnic group
in Canada
Share of the co-ethnic population that the respondent belongs to
admitted into Canada in 2000 (Continuous)
Education outside Canada:
Bachelor’s or higher
Highest level of formal education attained outside of Canada is
Bachelor’s or higher (Dummy)
Formal learning of English
outside of Canada
Learned most of their English before coming to Canada through
language classes, a private tutor or schooling (Dummy)
Informal learning of
English outside of Canada
Learned most of their English before coming to Canada from
family/friends, self-study, work, media, everyday interactions or
other (Dummy)
Friend/family networks Respondent had friends/family in current area (or nearby area) and
chose this area because friends/family live here, in wave 1
(Dummy)
Age at immigration Age of the respondent (Continuous)
Male Gender of the respondent = Male (Dummy)
Married Marital status of the respondent = Married (Dummy)
Employed The respondent is employed full-time (Dummy)
Savings brought from
outside Canada
Total amount of savings brough from outside Canada (Continuous)
Family class Immigration category = Family class (Dummy)
Number of immigrating
members
Size of the immigrating party at the time of landing (Continuous)
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Number of members that have joined the household since landing
(wave 1) or since the last interview (waves 2 and 3) (Continuous)
Number of household
members
Size of household (Continuous)
Number of children Percentage of children living in the household (Continuous)
Months since arrival Number of months elapsed since landing in Canada (Continuous)
RGDP in place of Birth Real GDP of place of birth of the respondent relative to Canada
(Continuous; Heston, Summers & Aten, 2005)
Population in place of
birth
Population of place of birth of the respondent relative to Canada
(Continuous; Heston, Summers & Aten, 2005)
Distance from capital city
in place of birth (in ’000’s)
Distance of the capital city in the place of birth of the respondent
relative to Canada (Continuous; Mayer & Zignago, 2011)
Linguistic distance Linguistic distance of the official language in the place of birth of
the respondent relative to English (Continuous; Melitz & Toubal,
2014)
Table 9: Summary statistics.
Full sample Sub-sample
Variable Name Count Mean SD Count Mean SD
Speaking proficiency 291,135 0.692 0.462 229,362 0.700 0.458
Ethnic enclave 290,877 0.123 0.329 229,104 0.136 0.342
Formal investment 276,555 0.314 0.464 216,129 0.349 0.477
Informal investment 290,853 0.503 0.500 229,080 0.554 0.497
CMA of arrival: Toronto 291,141 0.484 0.500 229,368 0.554 0.497
CMA of arrival: Vancouver 291,141 0.135 0.341 229,368 0.159 0.366
Housing costs in CMA/CA of
arrival
291,141 13.111 2.207 229,368 13.630 1.848
Ethnic share in Canada 291,141 0.069 0.070 229,368 0.078 0.072
Atleast a Bachelor’s education
outside Canada
291,141 0.283 0.451 229,368 0.307 0.461
Formal pre-immigration
investment
291,066 0.744 0.436 229,368 0.807 0.395
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Table 9: Summary statistics.
Full sample Sub-sample
Variable Name Count Mean SD Count Mean SD
Informal pre-immigration
investment
291,066 0.262 0.440 229,368 0.290 0.454
Family/friend networks 291,141 0.818 0.386 229,368 0.832 0.374
Age at immigration 291,141 35.307 12.688 229,368 35.395 12.847
Male 291,141 0.494 0.500 229,368 0.491 0.500
Married 291,141 0.760 0.427 229,368 0.765 0.424
Employed 290,294 0.491 0.500 228,715 0.497 0.500
Savings brought from outside
Canada
275,625 6.311 4.560 217,260 6.227 4.617
Family class 291,141 0.328 0.470 229,368 0.348 0.476
Number of immigrating members 291,141 2.718 1.541 229,368 2.782 1.549
Number of joining members 291,141 0.626 1.222 229,368 0.671 1.288
Number of household members 291,141 3.833 1.723 229,368 3.981 1.753
Number of children 291,141 0.662 0.902 229,368 0.679 0.908
Months since arrival 291,141 27.554 17.454 229,368 27.558 17.456
RGDP in place of birth 291,141 0.847 0.899 229,368 0.882 0.911
Population in place of birth 291,141 10.113 14.104 229,368 11.459 14.623
Distance from capital city in
place of birth (×1000′s)
291,141 10.080 2.751 229,368 10.646 2.307
Linguistic distance in place of
birth
291,141 0.864 0.194 229,368 0.897 0.135
Note 1: Sub-sample of 18-64 year old from non-English speaking households whose mother tongue is
not English, and do not reside in Quebec
Note 2: All variables are weighted using the weights provided with the LSIC by Statistics Canada.
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Table 10: OLS estimation results of English speaking proficiency: households whose




Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled,
sub-sample
Pooled Pooled IV
RGDP per capita (h) 0.0479*** 0.0407** 0.0399** 0.0395 0.0424** 0.0678**
(0.0135) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0202) (0.0142) (0.0231)
Network (β) -0.0227 -0.00591 -0.0199 0.0124
(0.0131) (0.0218) (0.0130) (0.0236)
Ethnic enclave (ζ) -0.0984*** -1.033*
(0.0161) (0.406)
Informal investment (ι) -0.0465*** -0.0459*** -0.0416* -0.0447*** -0.0321*
(0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0172) (0.0101) (0.0151)
Formal investment (ι) -0.0648*** -0.0652*** -0.0875*** -0.0666*** -0.0834***
(0.0131) (0.0130) (0.0205) (0.0130) (0.0191)
Formal pre-immigration 0.195*** 0.195*** 0.104*** 0.194*** 0.181***
experience (ω) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0241) (0.0158) (0.0223)
Informal pre-immigration 0.0881*** 0.0876*** 0.0645*** 0.0851*** 0.0652***
experience (ω) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0188) (0.0116) (0.0196)
Share of co-ethnic group in 0.379 -0.0390 -0.0322 -2.782*** 0.0901 1.210
Canada (m) (0.257) (0.247) (0.246) (0.612) (0.246) (0.628)
Population level (L) -0.00719*** -0.00495*** -0.00496*** 0.00620 -0.00529*** -0.00831**
(0.00142) (0.00138) (0.00138) (0.00638) (0.00138) (0.00255)
Geographic distance (µ) -0.00244 -0.00820* -0.00800* 0.000995 -0.00760* -0.00377
(0.00337) (0.00328) (0.00329) (0.00434) (0.00327) (0.00443)
Linguistic distance (θ) 0.0297 0.0519 0.0505 -0.350*** 0.0515 0.0624
(0.0561) (0.0530) (0.0530) (0.104) (0.0528) (0.0672)
Months since arrival -0.0115* -0.0103* -0.0103* -0.0143 -0.0103* -0.0121
(0.00509) (0.00504) (0.00504) (0.00850) (0.00503) (0.00673)
Time-varying controls
(Xist)
X X X X X X
Time-invariant controls
(Xis)
X X X X X X
Survey wave controls (t) X X X X X X
N 216,672 204,122 204,122 78,405 203,858 203,858
∗p < 0.05∗∗p < 0.01∗∗∗p < 0.001
Note 1: All models are weighted due to Statistics Canada’s RDC disclosure process.
Note 2: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
Note 3: The sub-sample excludes new immigrants from source countries that scored
“medium” or “high” on the EF EPI (2017).
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